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Threats of Terrorism Following 9/11

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HSE 460

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Revisions needed: Good work overall. I think this is laid out well.  However, I want to see more specifics related to Europe.  You mention domestic threats in the United States.  Put more of an emphasis on how the world changed overall and what direct threats may have existed in Europe.  What changes did Europe make?  I see your final paragraph. Most of your paper focuses on the U.S..  I would like specific examples from Europe.

Make sure you proofread to catch minor errors and typos.

Threats of Terrorism Following 9/11

Following 9/11, hundreds of citizens and foreign nationals either have been arrested for jihadist terrorism or associated offenses, or they have passed away before being charged while being generally believed to have participated in jihadist criminal activities. Although there have been terrorist attacks every year since 9/11, the advent of ISIS has resulted in an unparalleled increase in instances. The number of terrorist incidents has decreased throughout the years since ISIS’s zenith of power. Since terrorism is a sophisticated, dynamic phenomenon that has changed as a result of state policies and internet radicalization, effective counterterrorism measures must be put in place to protect against the terrorist threat’s continuous growth.

The process through which individuals utilize the Internet, especially social networking sites and other online interaction platforms, to become exposed to, replicate, and absorb extremist opinions and beliefs is known as “online radicalization” (Binder & Kenyon, 2022). It should not be hidden that this definition was chosen purely pragmatically and that nearly every one of its terms has been challenged. According to Hamid and Ariza (2022), forensic experts view radicalized persons as having a higher likelihood of committing violent crimes that could result in widespread harm and death, similar to acts of terrorism. Concerns about terrorism and grievance-based violence have increased significantly as a result of the increasing incidences of online radicalization. Recently, a comparison method has been created, which is based on the commonalities among persons who commit acts like terrorist attacks, hate crimes, and deadly school shootings (Ebbrecht, 2022). The lines separating terrorism from other types of criminal activity are becoming increasingly hazy, especially for those who are considered lone actors (Clemmow et al., 2022). According to Capellan (2015), mass shootings that are ideological or not fall under the larger category of homicides known as lone actor grievance-fueled violence. Similar to this, Clemmow et al. (2022) build their generic Lone Actor Grievance-Based Violence theory on a thorough cluster analysis of multiple factors (leakage, propensity, preparatory, situation, and network indicators), which allows for the inclusion of both lone actors and mass murders.

Dino Krause investigates why big transnational groups succeed when they grow into specific countries but fall short when they try to do it repeatedly in other situations (Krause, 2023). It has been discovered that a competent administration greatly lowers the likelihood of a “transnationalization,” or the entry of al-Qaeda or IS into a regional battle (Krause, 2023). In particular, regimes that unjustly detain citizens, violate fundamental human rights regularly, or torture detainees run a much greater danger of having IS or al-Qaeda infiltrate local wars within their borders. In theory, Krause contends that in these situations, people may be more readily enlisted even if they do not adhere to the jihadist doctrine because they are seeking revenge or safety from atrocities they have witnessed being carried out by state agents.

Concerns over the degree to which police and military personnel have committed acts of domestic terrorism and suffered from it is growing. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued a warning in 2021 that it was being targeted by domestic extremists (DE), particularly those who advocate for beliefs associated with white nationalism or white supremacist ideology (Jones et al., 2021). In 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation reported to the Department of Defense that it had opened 143 criminal cases involving serving or former military members, 68 (almost half) of which involved connections to domestic extremism (Jones et al., 2021). It appears that veterans, several of whom received unfavorable discharge records, were involved in most inquiries. Concerns were further aroused by the events of January 6, 2021, at the U.S. Capitol, where at least 31 veterans, one National Guard member, and one reservist were accused of conspiracy or other offenses (Jones et al., 2021).

Promptly following the events of 9/11, decision-makers proclaimed transnational terrorism to be the next big threat to global security (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019). Some even went so far as to characterize the fight against Islamist terrorism as “World War IV,” a never-ending war between the Western world and radical Islam, to articulate the idea that 9/11 radically altered the course of history (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019). Popular media reports frequently reinforce the idea that the world has become more unpredictable and dangerous now than ever. This attitude is consistent with these storylines. Over 75% of all terrorist deaths in the past five years have occurred in six nations plagued by civil unrest: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, Pakistan, and Yemen. States with larger Muslim populations could anticipate lower levels of domestic terrorist activity within their borders before 2002 (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019). It’s the other way around since then. The number of acts of internal and international terrorism in countries with a large Muslim population is substantially higher. Over the past 15 years, there seems to have been an increase in the persistence and scope of jihadist terrorism. This could be explained, among other things, by Jihadi groups choosing to concentrate their fire on the “near enemy” as opposed to foreign powers (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019). Another possibility is that the West’s defensive strategies have compelled a change in the targets. This shift might also be largely attributed to internal upheavals in the Muslim world and the reactions of the West to them.

Between 2006 and 2011, Europe’s security and public concerns about terrorism progressively decreased. Citizens considered terrorism less of a priority as terrorist acts decreased and other issues, like the global economic crisis, became more pressing (Smith & Zeigler, 2017). In late 2005, 14% of Europeans thought that one of the two major national challenges was terrorism; by late 2011, that number had dropped to 4%. Furthermore, there appeared to be less political interest in terrorism. The EU Counter terrorism Coordinator described “CT fatigue” in this context he observed that amid numerous other issues that directly affected people’s lives (de Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2023). Western European cultures eventually grew used to a less serious but still present threat from jihadism after several years of feeling under siege. After IS lost ground, attacks persisted, mostly by lone actors. Nonetheless, people accepted these attacks, which resulted in comparatively few casualties—as the “new normal.”

In conclusion, the post-9/11 terrorism world requires a refined approach to the use of the online radicalization, state repression dynamics, and complex dance between jihadist insurgencies. Notwithstanding these difficulties, there is cause for optimism due to the modest toll that domestic terrorism takes. Americans have not been killed by far-right or far-left extremist violence, not in recent memory.

References

Binder, J. F., & Kenyon, J. (2022). Terrorism and the internet: How dangerous is online radicalization?
Frontiers in Psychology,
13(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.997390

Capellan, J. A. (2015). Lone Wolf Terrorist or Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Active Shooter Events in the United States, 1970–2014.
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
38(6), 395–413. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610x.2015.1008341

Clemmow, C., Gill, P., Bouhana, N., Silver, J., & Horgan, J. (2020). Disaggregating Lone-actor Grievance-fuelled Violence: Comparing Lone-actor Terrorists and Mass Murderers.
Terrorism and Political Violence,
34, 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1718661

de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J., & Bakker, E. (2023). Twenty years of countering jihadism in Western Europe: from the shock of 9/11 to “jihadism fatigue.”
Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2023.2200411

Ebbrecht, C. K. (2022). Systematic review: Risk factors and mechanisms of radicalization in lone-actor grievance-fueled violence.
Nordic Psychology, 1–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/19012276.2022.2074524

Gaibulloev, K., & Sandler, T. (2019). What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11.
Journal of Economic Literature,
57(2), 275–328. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181444

Hamid, N., & Ariza, C. (2022).
Offline Versus Online Radicalisation: Which is the Bigger Threat? https://gnet-research.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/GNET-Report-Offline-Versus-Online-Radicalisation.pdf

Jones, S. G., Doxsee, C., Hwang, G., & Thompson, J. (2021).
The Military, Police, and the Rise of Terrorism in the United States. Www.csis.org. https://www.csis.org/analysis/military-police-and-rise-terrorism-united-states

Krause, D. (2023). Armed Conflicts With Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State: The Role of Repression and State Capacity.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 002200272311762-002200272311762. https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231176237

Raineri, L. (2020). Explaining the Rise of Jihadism in Africa: The Crucial Case of the Islamic State of the Greater Sahara.
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34(8), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2020.1828078

Smith, M., & Zeigler, S. M. (2017). Terrorism before and after 9/11 – a more dangerous world?
Research & Politics,
4(4), 205316801773975. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017739757